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Abstract
We estimate the aggregate productivity gains from reducing barriers to internal la-
bor migration in Indonesia, accounting for worker selection and spatial differences in
human capital. We distinguish between movement costs, which mean workers will
only move if they expect higher wages, and amenity differences, which mean some
locations must pay more to attract workers. We find modest but important aggregate
impacts. We estimate a 22% increase in labor productivity from removing all barri-
ers. Reducing migration costs to the U.S. level, a high-mobility benchmark, leads to
a 7.1% productivity boost. These figures hide substantial heterogeneity. The origin
population that benefits most sees an 104% increase in average earnings from a com-
plete barrier removal, or a 25% gain from moving to the U.S. benchmark.
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Recent evidence suggests that a policy of encouraging internal labor migration could have
large productivity effects in developing countries. On the macro side, Gollin et al. (2014)
show that nonagricultural (urban) workers produce four times more than their agricul-
tural (rural) counterparts. On the micro side, Bryan et al. (2014) show a 33% increase in
consumption from experimentally induced seasonal migration. Neither of these results,
however, is definitive: The experimental estimates apply only to seasonal migration, and
to a specific part of Bangladesh. The macro estimates do not account for selection on un-
observables (Young 2013), and only apply to movement between rural and urban areas.
This paper uses micro data from Indonesia to quantify the aggregate effect of increas-
ing mobility. Two observations motivate our approach. First, migration could increase
productivity if it: (1) allows individuals to sort into a location in which they are person-
ally more productive (sorting); (2) allows more people to live in more productive locations
(agglomeration); or (3) both.1 Second, in the absence of constraints or amenity differen-
tials, people will maximize their production; therefore, a policy that encourages migration
will have no effect on output if there are no existing constraints on mobility.
We build a model in which workers have idiosyncratic location-specific productivity,
and in which locations differ in their overall productivity. This setup allows for both sort-
ing and agglomeration effects. Into this framework we incorporate two kinds of mobility
constraints. Movement costs exist if workers must be paid higher wages to induce them
to work away from home. Compensating wage differentials exist if workers must be
paid higher wages to work in low-amenity locations. The result is a general equilibrium
Roy model in which workers sort across locations that have heterogeneous amenities and
productivities. The model is similar to that used by Hsieh et al. (2018); our approach
also has close connections to the seminal work of Hsieh and Klenow (2009).2 We use this
1We use the term agglomeration to encompass two mechanisms that are often separated in the litera-
ture: the first is more people living in locations with higher fundamental productivity, the second is the
externalities that arise when more people live close to each other.
2Our framework also has much in common with recent quantitative models of economic geography
such as Allen and Arkolakis (2014), Redding (2016) and Desmet et al. (2016). We also draw on important
contributions studying commuting, e.g. Monte et al. 2018 and Ahlfeldt et al. (2015). Our framework is
similar to that used in work by Tombe and Zhu (2015). Relative to that paper, we use more detailed micro
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structural framework to quantify the change in aggregate productivity that would result
from removing movement costs and/or equalizing amenity differentials. Like Hsieh and
Klenow (2009) and Caselli (2005), we do not consider specific policies, but rather try to
quantify the potential impacts of a set of policy options.
Our main contribution is combining this quantitative framework with rich micro data
from Indonesia. The Indonesian data, which are unique in recording location of birth,
current location and current earnings, allow for particularly transparent identification
of key model parameters. For example, we are able to identify the key parameter that
controls sorting from a simple linear regression of the origin-destination wage on the
origin-destination migration share. Intuitively, across-destination/within-origin varia-
tion in migration rates can be used to estimate the strength of selection forces, but few
datasets contain the information necessary to run this regression.
Before turning to our structural analysis, we document five motivational facts, which
suggest both that movement costs and compensating differentials exist, and that selection
is important in the data. Our rich micro data allow us to demonstrate these facts. In the
case of movement costs, we first show that a gravity relationship holds in the data. A
10% reduction in the distance between two locations leads to a 7% increase in the propor-
tion of migrants who flow between the two locations. We also show that people who live
farther from their location of birth have higher wages. A doubling of distance leads to a
3% increase in average wages, suggesting that people need to be compensated to induce
them to move away from home. In running these regressions, we think of distance as
a proxy for movement costs, which may not capture all policy-relevant constraints. For
compensating differentials, we show that workers in observably low-amenity locations
receive higher wages. Selection effects also appear to be important in the data: the greater
the share of people born in origin o that move to destination d, the lower their average
wage. The elasticity of average wage with respect to share is approximately −0.04. Im-
portantly, because our model is one in which movement costs reduce migration and lead
to selection, we show that there is almost no effect of distance on average wages once the
data which enables us to directly estimate the extent of selection, and we are interested in a different set of
questions.
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proportion of the origin population at the destination is controlled for; proportion migrat-
ing is sufficient to account for the wage differences. All of these effects are predicted by
our model. We also show that the same set of motivating facts hold for migration between
states in the U.S.
To estimate the potential effects of policy, we turn to our structural model. When
estimating the model, we treat both movement costs and amenity differentials as non-
parametric objects to be inferred from the data. Movement costs are nonparametric in the
sense that we estimate a separate cost for each origin-destination pair that is independent
of distance or any other measure. Our measures of movement costs therefore capture a
wide range of barriers. For example, language differences that reduce bilateral migration
would be a movement cost. Amenities, following the tradition in urban economics, are
estimated as a residual.The choice to treat movement costs and amenity differentials in
this way reflects our view that amenities are hard to measure and distance is unlikely to
capture all policy-relevant dimensions of movement costs.
Our model allows for straightforward quantification of the effects of reducing move-
ment cost-driven, or amenity-driven, wage differentials. The intuition is straightforward.
We first generate counterfactual population distributions by estimating where people
would live if we removed their empirical tendency to stay at their place of birth and their
tendency to avoid some locations that have high measured productivity. Next, we ask
how productivity would change if people moved as suggested by our counterfactuals.
Our model of selection implies that each additional migrant will earn less than the last; to
account for this we need to understand how wages change as workers move. Since selec-
tion, in our model, is relative to location of birth, it is the average wages of people from
a given origin who live in a given destination that matter. As noted above, our unique
data, which captures both location of birth and current location of work, combined with
an instrumental variables (IV) strategy inspired by our model, allows us to estimate the
relevant elasticity.
Our results suggest moderate aggregate gains, but important heterogeneity. Remov-
ing all frictions is predicted to increase aggregate productivity by 22%. These gains are
modest relative to the potential gains suggested by studies such as Gollin et al. (2014), but
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are in line with what one may expect from other microeconomic studies. For the people
born in some locations, however, the results are much larger, with predicted gains peak-
ing at 104%. We show, theoretically and empirically, that gains are larger for origins that
have higher dispersion in average wages across destinations. Because complete barrier
removal may be impossible, we also compute the gains from moving to the U.S. level of
movement costs, which we see as a high-mobility benchmark. We predict an aggregate
productivity boost of 7.1%, with the origin that gains most seeing a 25% increase. We con-
clude that, while migration that improves the static allocation of labor is unlikely to have
very large productivity effects of the sort estimated, for example, by Hsieh and Klenow
(2009), targeted policies may have big impacts on the lives of some communities.
Our paper differs from existing approaches in three ways. First, we consider region-to-
region rather than rural-to-urban movement. Since Lewis (1954) and Harris and Todaro
(1970), the development and migration literature has been dominated by rural to urban
studies. In our setting this is potentially inappropriate. Figure 1 shows kernel density
plots of the log of the average monthly wage, calculated at the sub-province (Indonesian
regency) level and broken down by rural/urban status.3 The figure highlights that while
there is large variation between regencies, there is little overall variation between rural
and urban locations. Table 1 shows that the majority of migration also occurs within
category, rather than across category: between 75 and 85% of migration out of urban
areas is to another urban area, and between 25 and 30% of migration out of a rural area
is to another rural area. Focusing only on rural-urban migration misses the within-rural
and the within-urban migrations.
Second, we focus on counterfactual estimates that predict the effect of removing con-
straints. While we can learn much from work documenting returns to past migration,4
there are challenges moving from these estimates to predictions of future returns. On
one hand, selection effects mean future migrants may earn less than past migrants; on
3 We code regencies that have greater than median rural population share as rural, and the remaining
regencies as urban. Appendix Figure 1 shows that the same patterns hold if we plot the distribution of
individual, rather than regency average, wages.
4Recent work by Kleemans and Magruder (2017); Hicks et al. (2017); Beegle et al. (2011); Garlick et al.
(2016) provide important estimates of the returns to, and impact of, past migrations in Indonesia, Kenya,
Tanzania and South Africa.
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the other hand, migration policies work by reducing constraints, and so will tend to en-
courage migration where past movement was minimal. Because of this, past returns may
contain little information on the likely effects of future policies. For our analysis we di-
rectly estimate the impact of removing constraints. Our only use of past migration is to
estimate the strength of selection effects. While this approach is similar to macroeconomic
estimates based on productivity gaps (e.g. Gollin et al. 2014), it accounts for selection ef-
fects that are likely to be important.
Finally, we take account of general equilibrium (GE) effects. First, by incorporating
sorting, we allow for aggregate productivity gains in the absence of large net populations
flows. Second, we calibrate agglomeration, congestion, rental, and price elasticities using
consensus estimates, and we then assess how our results depend on these parameters.
Our results are limited in three ways. First, we look only at static gains, leaving exam-
ination of dynamic effects for future work.5 Second, when doing our counterfactuals we
look only at the productivity impacts, and only at gains. We do not consider welfare ef-
fects of removing migration restrictions (which may be negative) and we do not consider
the costs of policy. A full consideration of costs is difficult and can be avoided if benefits
are small. Third, we do not consider specific policies, but rather provide estimates of the
total gains that may be available. Our approach is similar, therefore, to the development
accounting and macro misallocation literatures (Caselli, 2005; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009).
The paper starts by laying out five motivational facts. These facts strongly suggest
that spatial labor markets in Indonesia are characterized by costs of movement, compen-
sating wage differentials and selection on productivity. The facts imply the possibility
of productivity gains from increased movement. We then provide a simple two-location
example that explains how we quantify the possible gains. We follow this by briefly de-
scribing our formal model, discussing identification and estimation, and demonstrating
that our structurally estimated parameters correlate sensibly with real world proxy mea-
sures. Finally, we present results from counterfactual exercises.
5There are several potential sources of dynamic gains. For example, migration costs may be endogenous
(Carrington et al., 1996), firm openings may depend on the pool of available migrant labor, or both.
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2 Data, Motivation, and Two-Location Example
2.1 Data
Our approach has specific data requirements. In our view, people will only migrate if their
earnings increase enough to compensate them for living away from home (which we take
to be their location of birth). We therefore need data that records an individual’s location
of birth, current location of work, and earnings. Our interest in aggregate returns implies
that data have to be geographically representative. Because we want to nonparametrically
estimate movement costs, the dataset must be large enough that it records flows between
all pairs of locations. Data of this kind are available in very few locations, and Indonesia
is the unique country that meets these specifications and has location recorded at a level
below the equivalent of a state.
Our Indonesian data come from the 1995 SUPAS (Intercensal Population Survey) and
from the 2011 and 2012 SUSENAS (National Socioeconomic Survey). These datasets
record, for a large representative set of people, location of birth (origin o), current work
location d (which could be the same as the origin), and monthly earnings (which we re-
fer to as the wage). A limitation of these data is that they do not capture earnings for
the self-employed. To understand the biases that this may introduce, we supplement the
SUPAS/SUSENAS data with data from the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS), a longi-
tudinal survey. The IFLS has a much smaller sample and by design covers only 13 out
of 25 Indonesian provinces, but it does collect more detailed information on incomes, in-
cluding for the self-employed, and follows the same individuals over time. While we
cannot use the IFLS data to estimate the structural model, we can use it to understand
how key parameter estimates are affected by the limitations of the SUPAS/SUSENAS
data. We also use data from the United States, both to show that our migration facts hold
more generally and to generate a suitable counterfactual for a high-mobility economy.
We use the 1990 5% Census sample and the 2010 American Community Survey, as these
dates overlap most closely with our Indonesia dates. In all cases, we restrict the sample
to be male heads-of-household between 15 and 65 years old.6 Summary statistics for the
6This restrictions reduces our sample size in Indonesia from 419,760 to 187,065. We restrict to male head
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Indonesian and the United States sample are given in Appendix Table 1. Summary statis-
tics for the IFLS sample are given in Appendix Table 2. All wage variables are reported in
monthly terms.
In the U.S., we have locations of birth and work recorded at the level of the state; in
Indonesia, we have this information for the regency (and, aggregating up, at the province
level).7 Because of the census nature of our data, our measure of migration is permanent
migration based on a repeated cross-section. This may miss people who have moved
multiple times, or who have moved and returned home. To ascertain the scope of these
issues, we look at detailed migration histories collected in the IFLS. A migration episode
in the IFLS is defined as a move lasting at least six months. We find that multiple and
return migration are not large issues in our context. As Appendix Table 3 shows, mi-
gration in Indonesia can be broadly characterized as one permanent migration episode,
made in adulthood. Looking at male household heads, conditional on moving out of the
birth province, 69% of all migrants make only one migration, 26% make two moves, and
only 5% make three or more moves. Importantly, only 8% of migration is undertaken
by people under the age of 16 and 50% of second migrations are made by people return-
ing home. These numbers are broadly similar to those for the U.S., where Kennan and
Walker 2011 find that the average male migrant makes 1.98 moves and 50.2% of movers
move home.
We use the 2005 and 2011 Village Potential Statistics (PODES) datasets to get measures
of amenity. These data are reported by a local leader and contain information on all
locations, both urban and rural, in Indonesia. We collapse to the regency level, using
population weights.
of households as our model is one in which migration is motivated by work, and women and children may
migrate for a more diverse set of reasons. As we discuss below, the key parameter that drives our estimates
of the gains from migration is the distribution of talent in the population. Reassuringly, estimates of this
key parameter change little when we include both non-household heads as well as women. Tables available
upon request.
7Regency is a second level administrated subdivision below a province and above a district. For all
surveys, we drop the provinces of Papua and West Papua. We generate a set of regencies which have
maintained constant geographical boundaries between 1995 and 2010. This primarily involves merging
together regencies that were divided in 2001. This leaves us with a sample of 281 regencies. Later, for the
structural estimates we aggregate regencies up to the level of province, of which there are 25.
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2.2 Five Empirical Facts About Migration
From our data, we can calculate the proportion of people from each origin o that move to
each destination d, which we denote πdo, as well as the average wage within origin desti-
nation pair, wagedo. Using this data, we document five empirical facts about migration in
Indonesia. We present these five facts at the regency level. For the later estimation of the
model, we aggregate regencies into provinces.8 We then show that these basic facts about
migration also hold true in the U.S. sample.
Fact 1 (Gravity: Movement Costs Affects Location Choice). Controlling for origin and des-
tination fixed effects, the share of people born in o who move to d is decreasing in the distance
between o and d.
To document Fact 1, we run a regression
ln πdot = δdt + δot +β ln distdo +εdot
where δdt and δot are destination-year and origin-year fixed effects respectively and distdo
is the straight distance between regency o and regency d.9 The destination effect controls
for any productivity or amenity differences across destinations, and the origin effect con-
trols for the benefits of other possible locations from the perspective of those living at the
origin (this term is similar to the multilateral resistance term in the trade literature).
We interpret distance as a proxy for movement costs, which we think include both
the costs of travel as well as a broader set of concerns including cultural differences and
language differences. The results are shown in Table 2 Column 1. We estimate that the
elasticity of πdo with respect to distdo is negative, strongly significant, and sizeable. A 10%
increase in distance leads to a 7% reduction in the proportion migrating. These results
suggest that there are costs of moving people across space.
8The Indonesian results are also robust to aggregating to the province level (Appendix Table 4) and
using the IFLS data (Appendix Table 5). We report our motivational facts at the regency level because it
increases power. When we conduct our structural estimation we aggregate to the province level to reduce
the number of zeros in the bilateral migration matrix. We discuss the IFLS results in more detail in Section
6.5.2 where we consider the robustness of our estimates.
9distdo is the straight line distance, in kilometers, between the centroid of regency o and the centroid of
regency d. We have experimented with movement time, generated using Dijkstra’s algorithm and assump-
tions about the time cost of different types of travel. This does not materially affect the results.
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Fact 2 (Movement Costs Create Productivity Wedges). Controlling for origin and destination
fixed effects, the average wage of people born in origin o and living in destination d is increasing
in the distance between o and d.
To establish Fact 2, we run the regression
ln wagedot = δdt + δot +β ln distdo +εdot.
The results are shown in Table 2 Column 2. We estimate that the elasticity of the average
wage with respect to distance is positive, strongly significant, and sizeable. A doubling of
the distance between origin and destination leads to a 3% increase in the average wages.
These impacts can be very large. For example, the straight line distance from Denpasar
to Jakarta on the western tip of Java is about 1000km. On the other hand, the distance
from Denpasar to Banyuwangi on the eastern tip of Java is about 100km. Our estimates
suggest that the average wage of migrants from Denpasar to Jakarta will be 30% more
than those to Banyuwangi.
As we explain in more detail in our two location example below, this fact suggests
that movement costs reduce productivity. To easily illustrate this, consider two locations
d and d′ that are identical except that d is closer to o. Fact 2 implies that those who choose
to move to d′ have higher average wages than those who choose to move to d. Under
the hypotheses that the two destinations are identical, that workers are rational, and that
workers are paid their marginal product, the only way that those in d′ can have higher
wages is if distance (movement costs) dissuaded the moves of some positive productivity
movers, who would have earned less than the current average wage.
Fact 3 (Selection). Controlling for origin and destination fixed effects, the elasticity of average
wages with respect to origin population share is negative.
Fact 3 is documented by running the regression
ln wagedot = δot + δdt +β ln πdot +εdot. (1)
Estimates from this regression are presented in Table 2 Column 3. Our estimates, which
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are strongly statistically significant, show that the elasticity of average wages is negative.
In Indonesia, a doubling of the share of people who migrate to a particular destination
leads to a 4% decrease in average wages. This fact suggests selection on productivity.
If workers are paid their marginal products, then, controlling for destination productiv-
ity, the only way that average wages can differ across destinations within origin is if the
distribution of worker skills is a function of πdo. We show below that the coefficient on
ln πdot in this regression is the key parameter that measures the importance of selection
and sorting in our model. This fact is subject to a potential endogeneity concern: any
shock to productivity in destination d that differentially affects people from different ori-
gins o will tend to also alter πdo. Below, we use our full theoretical model to motivate an
instrument to correct for this. Instrumentation changes the quantitative results, but does
not alter the qualitative fact.
Fact 4 (Movement Costs Reduce Productivity by Reducing Selection). The elasticity of aver-
age wage to distance drops to almost zero after controlling for the fraction of the origin population
that migrate.
We document Fact 4 by running the regression
ln wagedot = δot + δdt +β ln πdot +γ ln distdo +εdot. (2)
Results are presented in Table 2 Column 4. The coefficient on ln πdt changes little when
the distance control is added, but the magnitude of the estimated distance effect, while
still positive and statistically signficant, drops relative to the results in Column 2, falling
to an economically insignificant size.
Facts 3 and 4 together suggest a framework where increasing movement costs, prox-
ied here by distance, lead to a reduction in the proportion of people who move (Fact 1).
This, in turn, leads to an increase in wages (Fact 2), but these wage effects are generated
by a selection effect created by a reduced proportion moving (Facts 3 and 4). This is con-
sistent with our discussion of Fact 2 and 3, where we assume that workers are paid their
marginal productivity, so once destination and origin fixed effects are controlled for wage
differences reflect selection. Importantly, Fact 4 suggests that our structural approach of
10
estimating the impact of reducing movement costs using the elasticity of wage with re-
spect to proportion moving will capture most of the effects of removing movement cost.
Fact 5 (Compensating Wage Differentials). Controlling for origin fixed effects, locations with
higher amenities have lower wages.
To document Fact 5 we run the regression
ln wagedot = δot + δdt +βamendt +εdot
where amendt is measured amenity in destination d at time t. To determine amenity, we
take six different measures of amenity from the Indonesian PODES survey and convert to
a single measure by taking the first principal component.10 We then standardize to give
this variable a zero mean and unit standard deviation. The results are shown in Table 2
Column 5. Our estimates imply that a 1 standard deviation increase in amenities leads to
a 2.3% decrease in average wages. This is direct evidence that firms pay a compensating
wage differential to attract workers to low amenity locations. Importantly, there is little
endogeneity concern with the sign of this result. While one may be concerned that higher
wage locations can afford higher amenities, this result goes in the opposite direction.
2.2.1 The basic facts also hold in the U.S. data
Table 3 shows that the main facts also hold for the U.S., when migration is defined as
crossing a state border. We show evidence for the first four facts as we do not have a mea-
sure of amenity at the state level for the U.S. Starting with Column (1), we find evidence
of a gravity equation for migration. Column (2) shows that wages in the destination are
increasing in the distance measured. Column (3) shows that wages in the destination are
decreasing in the share of people migrating, and Column (4) shows that the wage effect is
10We have two broad categories of amenities: amenities affecting services (“ease” amenities), such as the
ease of reaching a hospital, and negative amenities affecting pollution (“pollution” amenities), such as the
presence of water pollution in the last year. A full list of the amenities in the data are given in Appendix
Table 6. For the motivating fact we use the “ease” amenities only because we are concerned that pollution
is picking up economic output directly. We use the first principle component because we are interested in
computing a unidimensional measure of amenities. We only require our measure to be a proxy measure for
amenities.
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driven by the share of people migrating, not the distance effect. This implies that the same
framework can be used to interpret migration patterns in the U.S.: increasing movement
costs, proxied here by distance, lead to a reduction in the proportion of people that move,
which, because of selection effects, leads to an increase in wages.
2.3 An Example with Two Locations
In this section we briefly discuss a two-location version of our model. We highlight the
mechanisms through which migration costs and amenity differentials reduces produc-
tivity. We also show how we estimate the productivity impacts of policies that reduce
migration frictions. Because of the simplicity of the two-location model, we can give an
intuitive graphical analysis.
We think of each work place, or destination d, as being characterized by a productivity
wd and amenity αd. We also assume that each location produces different goods and that
people’s productivities depend on their location. In particular, we assume that the wage
of person i living in destination d is wdsid, where sid is the skill level of person i for location
d. Total utility for person i, from location o who decides to live and work in destination
d, is thenαdwdsid(1− τdo), where τdo is the cost that a person born in origin o pays to live
in destination d. We refer to τdo either as a movement cost or migration cost. We assume
that τdo ∈ [0, 1], τoo = 0 and τdo = τod. In our empirical work we will back out αd and
τdo as residuals, and so this way of writing the utility function normalizes the measure of
amenities and movement costs relative to wages.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of skill (sid) across two locations, which we call A and
B; the figure is drawn from the perspective of people born in location B. If there were no
frictions, people would live where their earnings, wdsid, are highest. As drawn, location
A has the higher productivity, and all those above the ray OE, which has slope wB/wA,
should move to location A (that is those in regions I, I I, and I I I should migrate). If the
two locations had equal productivity, those above the 45 degree line (in areas I and I I)
should move to maximize productivity.
With movement costs, people from B must be compensated for their move to A. This
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means that earnings in A are effectively less valuable, and only those above the line OC,
which has slope wB/wA(1− τAB) will choose to move. We can divide those born in lo-
cation B into four groups. Those below ray OE (the dots in region IV) should not move,
because their returns are highest to stay in B, and they do not. Those above OE and
below the 45 degree line (the dots in region I I I) should move, because A has higher pro-
ductivity than B. The higher productivity in A compensated these people for the fact
that their comparative advantage lies in B. With movement costs, these people do not
move. Those above the 45 degree line and below ray OC (the dots in region I I) should
move, for two reasons. First, they have a comparative advantage in location A. Sec-
ond, A is a more productive location. Consider person x: she loses productivity equal to
the distance xy because she has a comparative advantage in A but does not move, and
an additional amount yz because A is more productive. These two channels mean that
movement costs reduce productivity by reducing sorting, and by reducing agglomera-
tion in high-productivity locations. Finally, those above OC in region I should move and
they always do. In line with all models inspired by the work of Roy (1951), this figure
shows that those with the most to gain will move first, and therefore suggests limits on
the gains to promoting migration. It also highlights that most of the gains from migration
are to be had by encouraging movement to places where costs are high, and so historical
movements have been low.
Fact 2 and its interpretation can be seen in this diagram. As movement costs increase,
fewer people move to A and the wages of those that move increase. This increase occurs
because some people who would have been more productive in A now choose to stay in
B.11
Amenities also move worker locations away from the productivity-maximizing allo-
cation. With amenities, but no movement costs, people now maximizeαdwdsid. The effect
can be understood in the same diagram. With no movement costs and B having higher
relative amenity, the ray OC would have slope αBwBαAwA . The same effects – a lack of sorting
11This fact depends on the properties of the skill distribution. In the language of Lagakos and Waugh
(2013), comparative and absolute advantage must be aligned. Appendix D discusses the relationship be-
tween comparative and absolute advantage in our framework. We find evidence consistent with compara-
tive and absolute advantage being aligned. See also Adao (2016) for a discussion.
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and too little agglomeration – are present, and, so long as the level of amenity in A differs
from the level of amenity in B, productivity will not be maximized. The main difference
between amenity differentials and movement costs is that movement costs will reduce
migration relative to home, while amenity differentials reduce the number of people liv-
ing in one location relative to the other.
It is worth noting that selection plays two roles in our model. On one hand, worker
heterogeneity and selection are a source of gains. Movement costs, which stop work-
ers from moving to their location of comparative advantage, reduce productivity. On
the other hand, selection limits the potential gains from moving more workers to high-
productivity locations. In the absence of selection on productivity, all workers who move
will have the same wage, and so aggregate impacts of removing amenity differentials can
be larger.
Our empirical task is to estimate the gain in productivity that would come from allo-
cating people to their productivity-maximizing location. This problem can be separated
into two parts. First, we estimate the movement response. This is equivalent to estimat-
ing how many people lie in the triangle OCE. This is conceptually straightforward. In
the case where there are no productivity differences between locations, the productivity-
maximizing choice is that half the people from B will stay in B and half will live in A.
Second, we estimate how this movement will affect the average wages of the four groups
in our data: those from A that move to B, those from B that live in A and those that stay in
A or B. Functional form assumptions laid out below imply that average wages for these
groups are a constant elasticity function of the fraction of the origin population that live
in the destination. This elasticity is estimable given our data, which records origin and
destination, and is shown in Fact 3 above. Because our data records the proportion of
people from each origin who live in each destination πdo, and counterfactual population
distributions can be expressed in the same way, this elasticity is sufficient to estimate the
counterfactual aggregate productivity. In the next two sections, we lay out how these
ideas extend to more than two locations, how to account for heterogeneous location pro-
ductivities, and how we incorporate general equilibrium effects.
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3 Model
In this section we present a static general equilibrium model of migration. The model is
designed to be as simple as possible, we discuss a number of extensions and how they
might affect the results in Appendix B. The model is an adaptation of the labor sorting
model in Hsieh et al. (2018), which itself draws on Eaton and Kortum (2002). The model
also has similarities with recent work on quantitative economic geography, particularly
Allen and Arkolakis (2014), and quantitative urban economics, particularly Monte et al.
2018 and Ahlfeldt et al. (2015).12
The economy consists of N locations. Workers are born in a particular origin (o), draw
a skill for each destination (d), and sort across destinations according to wages, amenity
and migration costs. Migration costs are relative to the birth location. Wages and ameni-
ties are endogenous and adjust to ensure equilibrium. We first discuss how workers
choose where to live and work taking wages and amenities as given, and then turn to
production and general equilibrium determination of wages and amenities.
3.1 Utility and Sorting
Lo individuals are born in each origin o. Each person i receives a skill draw sid for each
possible work destination d ∈ N. It seems unlikely that this is literally true, what we have
in mind is that people have different talents for different industries, and that different
destinations have different represented industries. So, for example, a person who is very
talented at data science would have a high draw for San Francisco, while someone with a
talent for banking would have a relatively high draw for New York.13The individual also
12The urban models include a cost of commuting, which is conceptually similar to our treatment of move-
ment costs. See Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017) for a review of work on quantitative spatial models.
13In fact, as noted by Lagakos and Waugh (2013), the assumption that talent is drawn from a Fréchet
distribution is consistent with this interpretation. Hence, we can think of the assumption that sd is drawn
from a Fréchet distribution as being consistent with a richer setting in which individuals receive skill draws
for a large number of industries in each destination, and choose the industry that maximizes their wage.
The main challenge to this interpretation is that data limitations mean that we are forced to assume that
talent draws for each destination are drawn from the same Fréchet distribution; we show in Appendix
D that there is no evidence that the shape parameters differ by destination or origin, consistent with this
assumption. Given this interpretation of the shock, migration frictions will include frictions that prevent
people from moving industry, if that industry move requires migration.
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receives a skill draw for her location of origin. Skill is drawn from a multivariate Fréchet
distribution,










which does not depend on the location of birth.14 Here, θ̃ measures the extent of skill
dispersion or the importance of comparative advantage. As θ̃ decreases, there is a greater
difference between skills across locations. ρ measures the correlation in skills across lo-
cations. As ρ increases, individuals with a high draw in destination d are also likely to
have a high draw for destination d′. The interpretation is that each different location has
a different set of required skills. To the extent that θ̃ is estimated to be high, locations do
not differ greatly in their skill requirements. We allow for correlation between skill draws
to allow for general talent, and the case in which talent is unidimensional is a limiting
case as ρ→ 1. Throughout it is useful to work with θ = θ̃/(1− ρ) rather than θ̃.
Innate skills are combined with schooling in the location of origin to become human
capital. Location d human capital for individual i born in location o is given by
hido = sidqo.
Throughout, we refer to qo as the quality of schooling in o, but it likely reflects a broader
set of factors that contribute to human capital. We consider the possibility of endoge-
nous acquisition of human capital in Appendix B. The wage per effective unit of labor in
destination d for someone from origin o is given by wdεwdo where wd is destination d pro-
ductivity, andεwdo is a mean one log normally distributed error which captures any reason
why people from origin o may be more productive in destination d (i.e., it is an origin-
specific labor demand shifter in destination d). We assume that the error is observed by
the individual before they migrate, and we introduce it because it allows for a meaningful
discussion (in Section 4.1) of an intuitively important endogeneity issue: any unmeasured
characteristic that increases productivity in destination d, will also increase movement to
14We later introduce a difference in skill by origin, qo, the resulting model is isomorphic to one in which
the scale parameter of the Fréchet parameter differs across locations. The important assumption is that θ̃
does not differ by origin.
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Indirect utility for individual i from origin o living in destination d is given by
Uido = αdεαdo(1− τdo)wdεwdosidqo ≡ w̄dosid. (3)
The term wdεdoqosid captures consumption, which is equal to the wage.The term αd mea-
sures the amenity of location d and captures the need for compensating differentials.
Moving to a location with half the amenity level would be compensated for by a dou-
bling of earnings. Amenities could include natural beauty, the availability of services, or
rental rates.15 The term εαdo is assumed to be mean zero and log-normally distributed; it
captures differences in amenity that depend on location of origin. Again, this error term
is observed by the individual before making the decision to move, and ensures that the
model does not perfectly fit the data. The term τdo captures the utility cost of living away
from home (the origin o), and we refer to it as a moving cost. We assume that τoo = 0, so
that moving away from home to a destination d would require an individual to be com-
pensated with (1− τdo) times the income. For example, compared to consumption at the
origin o, the same level of consumption at destination d may be less pleasurable as it is
not undertaken with family and friends. We assume throughout that movement costs are
symmetric, so that τdo = τod. With this background, known results regarding the Fréchet
distribution imply the following results.










where w̃do = wdεwdoαdε
α
do(1 − τdo). Here w̃do measures the attractiveness of location d
for someone from o. Equation (4) is the key sorting equation, and it asserts that sorting
15Much work in the tradition of Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982) separate out rents from other amenities.
We discuss how to incorporate rents in Appendix B.3.
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depends on relative returns, relative amenities and relative movement costs; it does not
depend on the quality of human capital formation in the origin, qo. That sorting does
not depend on qo is key to our exercise: we wish to distinguish between human capital
or schooling effects that lead to higher production and human capital effects which are
a barrier to migration. Barriers to migration coming from differences in human capital
are, to the extent they are symmetric, captured in τdo. To the extent that human capital
differences are a barrier to migration but are not symmetric, they will be captured in εwdo
and will not form part of our counterfactuals.
Second, we can use this characterization to determine the average skill of workers
from o working in d by noting that
E(sd | choose d) = π
− 1θ
do Γ̄ , (5)





and Γ(·) is the Gamma function. This equation implies that the
more people from o that move to d, the lower is their average skill. This is intuitive as
it implies that there is less selection: the marginal migrant is drawn from further down
the left tail of the talent distribution. Finally, we can work out the average wage in a
particular location for people from a given origin:




do Γ̄ . (6)
Equations (4) and (6) are our main estimating equations. Taking logs of these two equa-
tions also shows that the model is consistent with the motivating facts discussed earlier.
Fact 1, gravity, is an estimate of equation (4), where distance is substituted for moving
cost. Facts 2 and 5 come from (6), with πdo substituted from equation (4). Facts 3 and 4
come directly from (6).
One important implication of our modeling choices is worth noting. When we observe
large average wage gaps between locations or sectors, it is tempting to think that there
will be large productivity gains to moving people. Our model highlights two reasons
why this may not be the case. First, the gaps may reflect selection, as in Young (2013).
Second, those in low-productivity locations may simply have low human capital in total,
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captured by low qo in our model. In our empirical work, we will estimate qo, allowing for
unobservable heterogeneity in the quality of human capital production.
3.2 Production and General Equilibrium
Each location is assumed to produce a differentiated good yd. This output is produced by
a large number of firms in each location that each produce an identical product according
to a linear production technology. Profits for firm j in location d are given by
Π jd = pd Adh jd − w jdh jd
where Ad is labor productivity in location d, pd is the price, which firms take as given, w jd
is the wage paid by firm j, and h jd is the total amount of human capital employed by firm
j. Firms compete for laborers by setting wages w jd, which implies that in equilibrium
w jd = wd and Π jd = 0 ∀ j and so
wd = pd Ad.













where yd is the total production in location d, andσ captures the degree of substitutability
between products produced by different locations.16 Prices pd are determined by assum-
ing a representative firm chooses yd to maximize total economy output less the costs of
production ∑d pdyd.17 This aggregate final good is costlessly traded across the country,
and is chosen as the numeraire. Utility is linear in the consumption of the aggregate final
good, leading to the utility function given in (3).
We allow productivity to be endogenous. Total output of good d depends on the
16If σ → ∞ all products are perfect substitutes, so the case in which all locations produce the same good
is a limit case of our model. An alternative specification would be to allow for locations to produce goods
that are perfectly substitutable with a decreasing returns to scale production function. Hsieh and Moretti
(2018) show that the two approaches are isomorphic.







amount of human capital in location d according to the function
yd = AdHd




is the productivity of location d. In this formulation, Ād can be thought of as intrinsic
productivity – an exogenous parameter – which may change over time. For example,
New York may presently have high productivity due to its proximity to a port, but this
may have been even more important 100 years ago. Current labor productivity, Ad, de-
pends on intrinsic productivity and the total amount of human capital in location d, with
γ parameterizing the extent of human capital spillovers, or productive agglomeration
externalities.
Finally, amenity is also endogenously determined. We assume
αd = αd L̂λd
where αd is baseline amenity; for example, natural beauty, λ is a measure of congestion
effects and likely to be less than zero, and L̂d is the (endogenously determined) population
of location d.
It is important to note one key characteristic of the model. Dividing through (4) and












Hence, within origin, there are no wage gaps (per unit of human capital) without frictions
(or, if only migration frictions are removed, then there are no amenity-adjusted wage
gaps).18There are two key assumptions that drive this result. The first assumption is that
18Note that this does not imply that average wages of people in a particular destination labor market
are not affected by wd. Average wages differ across origin, with people born in more productive locations
having higher average wages.
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comparative and absolute advantage are aligned. This leads to the fact that reducing fric-
tions will lead to a convergence in wages. The second assumption is that the elasticity
of wages to the proportion of the population (from an origin) is constant and is the same
across all locations. In our model we assume a Fréchet distributional assumption which
hard-bakes assumption (1), and then because we assume that shape parameters are con-
stant across all locations, this leads to assumption (2). We discuss these points fully in
Appendix D where we argue that it is not possible to reject these two assumptions in the
data.
The fact that, within origin, there are no wage gaps without frictions means that we
rule out the kind of behavior discussed in Young (2013), where selection alone drives
wage gaps. Our model is somewhere between the work of Young (2013), in which selec-
tion is the sole driver of average wage differences, and the work of Gollin et al. (2014),
where raw wage gaps are used to infer potential gains from movement.
Appendix B discusses how this basic model might be extended to account for dynam-
ics, endogenous human capital formation, non-traded goods such as housing, and costly
goods trade, and how these extensions would affect our results.
4 Identification and Estimation
In this section, we discuss how we identify and estimate the exogenous parameters of the
model {θ, ρ, qo, wd, αd, τdo}. We also note that, while they are important for the counter-
factuals, we do not need to take a stand on the general equilibrium parameters (γ, λ and
σ) for identification; we discuss their calibration below. We make several normalizations.
First, as noted above, we assume that τoo = 0 and τdo = τod: movement costs are sym-
metric, and it is costless to live at home. Second, we normalize α1 = 1: because we do
not observe utility levels, the only variation we have to identify α comes from people’s
relative preferences for locations. Third, we normalize q1 = 1: we identify only relative
qualities of human capital generation. This normalizes productivity wd as well: the wage
wd is what would be earned by someone living at location d who was born in location 1
and who has a skill draw of 1. This means that any aggregate improvement in human
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capital generation would be captured in productivities, w, and changes in q would cap-
ture changes in the spatial allocation of human capital production possibilities. Appendix
B discusses identification challenges that arise in a richer model.
4.1 Identification of Model Parameters
4.1.1 Fréchet parameters: {θ,ρ}
Taking the log of equation (6), we have




ln(πdo) + ln(qo)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Origin fixed effect
+ lnεwdo. (7)
That is, after controlling for origin and destination fixed effects, the elasticity of the aver-
age wage with respect to the proportion of migrants identifies the Fréchet parameter θ.
Intuitively, if people are very similar (or destinations differ little in their skill needs), then
θ is high, so the marginal migrant is not greatly less skilled than the previous migrant,
and the average wage will change little with movement. However, if dispersion in talent
is large (or there are large differences in the skill needs in different destinations), then the
marginal migrant is much less skilled than the previous migrant, and so their wage is
significantly lower.
Inspection of equation (4) shows that the error term εwdo also enters the definition of
πdo. This is intuitive; any random variation that means wages for those from origin o are
relatively high in destination d will encourage migration between the two locations. This
correlation between the error term and the regressor πdo creates an endogeneity problem
that will lead us to underestimate the extent of selection by overestimating θ.
We address this endogeneity concern with an instrumental variables strategy moti-
vated by our model. We wish to isolate the variation in πdo that is driven by variation in
the relative amenity of d and productivity in other locations ¬d. The proportion of peo-
ple from other origins ¬o who migrate to destination d is affected by these factors, but
not by the random error εdo. The set of migration proportions {πd¬o} are therefore valid
instruments for πdo, although the first stage relationship between ln πd¬o and ln πdo is
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nonlinear. Therefore, we follow the advice of Angrist and Pischke (2009) and instrument
ln πdo with the fitted value from a “zero stage” regression in which ln πdo is regressed on
a polynomial in ln πd¬o. Monte Carlo estimates based on a roughly calibrated version of
our model, which we discuss in Appendix C, confirm that this strategy leads to unbiased
estimates and suggests that there are few efficiency gains to increasing the polynomial
beyond a quadratic.















))2 − 1. (8)
Using data on the distribution of wages, combined with the θ identified as above, this
equation identifies ρ, the parameter defining the within-person correlation of skill. In-
tuitively, if there is little correlation in skill types, so that everyone has some destination
in which he or she excels, then the within-destination origin pair wage variance will be
low. If, in contrast, ρ is high, then people of many different skill levels will find the same
location to be best, and so the variance in observed wages will be high relative to the
mean.
4.1.2 Location characteristic affecting the wage: {wd, qo}
Considering again equation (7), with the estimates of ρ and θ in hand, we can identify





, which is identified. We
identify wd in levels using the normalization that q1 = 1. Intuitively, after controlling
for selection through πdo and the quality of human capital through qo, any differences
in wages between locations must be driven by differences in productivity. The quality
of the human capital environment qo can be similarly determined. After controlling for
productivity differences at the destination as well as selection, any differences in wages
earned by people from different origins must be accounted for by the relative quality of
human capital formation opportunities.
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4.1.3 Characteristics affecting movement: {τdo,αd}
Taking the log of (4) gives a gravity equation











This equation allows us to identify movement costs for each destination-origin pair that
are nonparametric, in the sense that they are not functions of any other data. Intu-
itively, low movement could be caused by amenity differences, productivity differences,
or movement costs. Among these, movement costs are the only force that leads both peo-
ple from o to be unlikely to move to d and people from d to be unlikely to move to o. This
intuition is confirmed by rearranging the gravity equation to give:
(ln πdo − ln πoo) + (ln πod − ln πdd) = 2θ ln(1− τdo) + ηdo,
where ηdo is a zero mean shock specific to the locations d and o.19 In this equation, τdo can
be separately identified from ηdo under the assumption that movement costs are sym-
metric, so that τdo = τod. We see that movement costs are high when people tend to
stay at home, and given an estimate of θ (identified as above), we can use differences in
movement relative to staying at home to identify τdo.
The gravity equation also allows for identification of relative amenities. In the tradi-
tion of urban economics, these amenities are residuals, not a function of any other data.




, is correlated with the error, but can be re-
moved by differencing the equation. Given this, and having identified wd, θ, and τdo,
the only unknown in (9) is αd. Intuitively, amenities are separated from movement costs
because, while movement costs lead people to stay at home, amenity differences lead to
a systematic flow of people toward particular locations. A location d is identified to have
a high relative amenity if there is a flow of people to d that cannot be accounted for by
productivity differences, measured by wd, or by propensity to stay at home, measured












by τdo. We can only identify amenities up to a normalization because of the origin fixed
effect in the equation.
4.2 Estimation
We estimate the model using Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML). The PPML
model has several advantages for estimating migration flows. First, because it estimates
the level of migration, rather than the log, it can rationalize zero observed migration flows
between locations. This is important because in our context, as in most studies of migra-
tion and trade flows, zero observed flows are common (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). Second,
the PPML model respects the general equilibrium adding-up constraints implicit in the
model (Fally, 2015).
Our two estimating equations, Equations (7) and (9), are:
ln(wagedo) = ln(Γ ) + ln(wd)−
1
θ
ln(πdo) + ln(qo) + lnεwdo (7’)









The identification assumption to estimate Equations (7’) and (9’) by PPML is that the
(level) error terms are mean one and are uncorrelated with the (exponentiated) regressors.
As discussed above, we assume that the errors are mean one, and we deal with correlation
with the regressors through IV and differencing strategies.
We proceed as follows. We first employ an IV procedure to estimate θ. We then take
this estimate ofθ and estimate the system of three equations (Equations 7’, 9’ and 8) using
a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator. In implementing the procedure, we
drop observations with fewer than five observed migrants from the wage data. Although
our estimation method rationalizes the presence of zero observed migration between any
two locations, we are concerned about small sample sizes affecting the precision of wage
estimates. We bootstrap this entire procedure to generate standard errors for our esti-
mated values of θ and ρ.
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5 Estimation Results
This section presents our parameter estimates. Our main goal is to show that our struc-
turally estimated parameters correlate with proxy measures and so they appear to mea-
sure something real. We show estimates for both Indonesia and the U.S. We use our
U.S. model to estimate U.S. level movement costs to generate a counterfactual for a high-
mobility economy. Our preferred estimates of migration cost use no structure other than
symmetry. We show that this nonparametric estimate correlates with observable charac-
teristics such as distance.
As noted above, the estimates presented in this section do not require us to take a
stand on the general equilibrium parameters {σ ,γ, λ}. These parameters will, however,
be important for the results of counterfactuals presented below. We discuss the calibration
and robustness of these important parameters in Section 6.
5.1 Fréchet Parameters
Table 4 presents estimates of the distributional parameters for both Indonesia and the
U.S. The shape parameter for the distribution of talent is determined by θ̃ = θ(1− ρ). We
estimate θ̃ equal to 2.7 for the U.S. and 3.2 for Indonesia. Our estimate of θ̃ = 2.7 compares
with the estimate of 2 in Hsieh et al. (2018). Separating the value into the component due
to the correlation within person, ρ, and the underlying distribution, θ, we find that talent
is more correlated in the U.S. compared with Indonesia (a value of 0.9 compared with 0.7),
and shows a less disperse distribution (a value of θ of 28 compared with 13). Appendix
Figure 2 shows random draws from the estimated distributions for Indonesia and the
U.S., where each axis is the productivity level for location 1 or 2. The figure shows that,
taking into account both dimensions, the skill distribution is overall more dispersed in
Indonesia than the U.S.
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5.2 Migration Costs
We estimate substantial migration costs. Table 4 reports the mean value of τdo. On aver-
age, migrants in Indonesia must be compensated with a 39% higher income, while Amer-
icans require a 15% gain. In this sense, the U.S. is a high-mobility country according to
our estimates.
Migration costs, for both the United States and Indonesia, correlate with distance. Fig-
ure 4 plots estimated migration cost τdo against the (log) of distance. Particularly striking
is the much lower correlation between distance and movement costs in the U.S. The elas-
ticity of cost to distance is 2% in the U.S., compared to 15% in Indonesia. Several mech-
anisms are possible causes. It may be that transportation is cheaper in the U.S. Alterna-
tively, it may be that people in the U.S. are more welcoming of migrants from physically
distant communities, or that the U.S. is more culturally homogenous.
Measured movement costs also correlate with measures of social distance. Using cen-
sus data, we construct indices of religious and linguistic similarity.20 Figure 3 plots the
relationship between these indices and movement costs, after controlling for distance.
There is no correlation between migration costs and religion, but migration costs are sta-
tistically significantly correlated with linguistic similarity.
5.3 Amenities
Estimated amenities correlate with measured amenities. The left panel of Figure 5 shows
that estimated amenities are negatively correlated with the (standardized) first principal
component of pollution amenities. The middle panel shows that estimated amenities cor-
relate positively with the first principal component of health and market access ameni-
ties.21 In line with the discussion of rents in Appendix B.3, the right panel shows that
20The index is constructed by calculating the probability that a person selected at random from the origin
will have the same characteristic (religion or language) as a person selected at random from the destination.
For example, if the origin is 50% Hindu and 50% Muslim, and the destination is 100% Hindu, then the
religious similarity index would be 0.5. If the destination was also 50% Hindu and 50% Muslim, then the
index would also be 0.5.
21Appendix Table 6 correlates the estimated amenities with observed amenities one-by-one. Each entry
in the table is the regression coefficient from a separate regression of estimated amenities on each amenity.
As we only have 25 estimated parameters, we do not expect individual signs to necessarily be statistically
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measured amenities correlate negatively with average housing costs.
5.4 Quality of Human Capital Formation
Figure 6 shows that the estimate of qo (educational quality) correlates with average ed-
ucational attainment. This is to be expected if people choose to receive more schooling
where there are higher returns to schooling.
6 Counterfactuals
We now turn to the policy question we posed at the start of the paper: would there be
productivity gains from removing mobility constraints? We have in mind policies that
change migration frictions only, and leave all other factors, for example trade costs, un-
changed. To produce counterfactuals, we need to take a stance on the GE parameters.
We set these using estimates from the literature, and then evaluate the robustness of our
findings to different choices.
A large literature estimates the agglomeration parameter (γ). The literature is re-
viewed in Rosenthal and Strange (2004) and Combes and Gobillon (2015). Recent con-
sensus estimates suggest a γ of between 0.01 and 0.02 for the developed world, although
some studies (e.g. Greenstone et al. 2010) suggest much higher numbers. Estimates for
developing countries are more sparse and suggest a γ up to 1. We present our main es-
timate for γ = 0.05, but also consider robustness for numbers between 0 and 0.08. We
expect that spatial integration will have a greater impact when γ is high.
A much smaller literature attempts to estimate the congestion parameter λ. As noted
in Appendix B, we can think of λ having a component that is due to the pure amenity
spillover, λa, and a component that is due to endogenous changes in housing prices, λr.
For the first term, the work in Albouy (2012) could be seen as suggesting that λa = 0 in
significant, but we note the general pattern in these results: overall, measures of pollution are negatively
correlated with amenities; measures of health outbreaks such as malaria, tuberculosis, and vomiting are also
negatively correlated with amenities, although access to health care facilities seems also to be negatively
correlated; village lighting and commercial banks are positively correlated, and we see a mixed pattern for
natural disasters such as flooding and earthquakes.
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the U.S. In contrast, work by Combes and Gobillon (2015) suggests a λa of around −0.04.
We take 0 as our starting point and consider various values in robustness exercises. For
the housing elasticity, λr, there are fewer estimates available in low-income countries. In
Appendix Table 7 we use rental data to estimate this for our sample and find a value of
0.25.22 (For comparison, Saiz 2010 estimates this number to be 0.65 for the United States),
which we take as a baseline value. Adjusting for the expenditure share of income on
housing, which we take to be 0.3, this implies λ = λα − 0.3λr = −0.075. We predict that
as λ decreases (and congestion becomes more important), reducing frictions will have a
smaller impact. It will be hard to move people into productive areas, even if movement
costs are low.
Accurate estimates of the elasticity of substitution across regions are also hard to ob-
tain. Allen and Arkolakis (2014) use a value of 8, while Bernard et al. (2003) find a value
of 4. We use 8 for our main results and consider values between 4 and 8 in robustness
tables. We expect that as σ increases, there will be larger benefits to spatial integration:
a high elasticity of substitution means that the products from different locations become
more substitutable, and so there are larger costs to low production of some goods.
6.1 Reducing Movement Costs
The first policy we consider is removing movement costs. On a practical basis, this might
be achieved by policies such as migration subsidies (Bryan et al. 2014), migrant welcome
centers, language training, and road building (Morten and Oliveira 2016). To estimate
possible impacts, we scale our estimated costs by a reduction factor κ, yielding ˜(1− τ) =
(1−τ)1−κ, withκ ∈ [0, 1]. Whenκ = 0 this corresponds to the baseline case we estimated.
Whenκ = 1 this corresponds to removing migration costs entirely.23 When we undertake
these counterfactuals. we allow for αd (the combination of natural amenities and rental
22The appendix table also employs the same identification strategy to directly estimate the spillover pa-
rameters for amenities and agglomeration. We get an estimate of 0.01 for the agglomeration parameter, 0.04
for the congestion parameter, and 0.25 for the housing price parameter. While caution should be taken with
these estimates, as both tests are underpowered (and the amenity test has the incorrect sign), we see these
results as being broadly consistent with our choice of baseline parameters of 0.05 for the agglomeration
parameter and 0 for the amenities parameter.
23The average value of τus = 0.15 and the average value of τind = 0.39, so the policy experiment of
lowering migration costs in Indonesia to the U.S. level is equivalent to considering 1− 0.61/0.85 = 0.28.
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prices) to adjust endogenously.
We find modest gains. We predict an 7.1% output gain from reducing migration costs
to the U.S. level, and a 7.5% gain from reducing migration costs to zero. The U.S. is usu-
ally considered the archetype of a spatially mobile economy, so the 7.1% figure is probably
the maximum attainable. These results are illustrated for a range of values of κ in Figure
7. This figure highlights an important implication of our model: productivity effects of
reducing movement costs may be non-monotonic, and, more generally, productivity may
decrease as movement costs fall. This can occur because reducing migration frictions can
lead workers to move away from high-productivity-low-amenity locations toward low-
productivity-high-amenity locations. Our estimates suggest that, in our setting, this neg-
ative impact of reducing movement costs does not occur till costs have been substantially
reduced, to lower than U.S. levels.
These modest gains hide substantial heterogeneity across origin populations. While
the average increase from eliminating all migration costs is 7.5%, the effect ranges from
-18% to 68%.24 That is, the people born in some provinces may see a 68% increase in their
average wage ∑d wagedo. For a move to the U.S. benchmark, the gains range from -5%
to 25%. The distribution of gains from complete removal is depicted in the first panel of
Figure 8 and the U.S. benchmark is presented in Figure 9. We discuss what drives these
heterogeneous results in Section 6.4 below.
As noted above, selection plays two roles in our model. On one hand, skill heterogene-
ity implies that there are gains from sorting. The greater the heterogeneity, the greater the
return to sorting. On the other hand, if each additional migrant earns less than the last,
selection will strongly reduce predicted gains from agglomeration. These two opposing
mechanisms mean that ignoring selection could lead to us to either over- or underesti-
mate policy gains. To understand the importance of selection, we recompute productivity
changes, shutting down the selection margin.25 Sorting is the main source of output gains
24Recall there is no restriction that reducing migration costs will lead to increases in output. Reducing
migration costs may lead people to migrate away from high-productivity-low-amenity locations towards
low-productivity-high-amenity ones. This is indeed what we see in these counterfactuals.
25We do this by setting the endogenous component of human capital equal to 1. This maps to a model
where people are migrating based on preference shocks, such as is considered in Allen and Arkolakis 2014
and Redding 2016.
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from removing migration costs. Column 1 in Table 5 shows that all estimated gains come
from improving worker sorting (we estimate a 7.5% gain with sorting, compared to a 8%
loss without sorting). Ignoring selection would lead us to underestimate the gains from
removing movement costs.
6.2 Reducing Amenity Dispersion
We consider a counterfactual in which amenities are equalized across space. This could
be the result of policies such as encouraging home building in high-demand locations,
which would tend to equalize rental rates (Harari 2017 and Hsieh and Moretti 2018), and
reducing pollution in high productivity cities and providing equal access to schooling and
hospitals, which would tend to equalize natural amenities. In undertaking these counter-
factuals we assume that it is possible to fully control endogenous changes in amenity and
rents so that all locations are equally desirable places to live. Amenities are estimated








, with κ ∈ [0, 1]. When κ = 0 this corresponds to the baseline case we
estimated. When κ = 1 this corresponds to equalizing amenities across all locations.
Here we do not compute a U.S. benchmark; this is for two reasons. First, we believe
that it is plausible to have zero amenity differentials: there is no obvious reason why
some locations have to have fewer services and more pollution. Second, in line with the
general argument in Hsieh and Moretti (2018), we find that the U.S. has greater amenity
dispersion than Indonesia. Hsieh and Moretti (2018) argue that that restrictive housing
policies lead to high rents in some very productive locations; this would show up in our
estimates as high amenity dispersion.
We find that equalizing amenities would lead to an increase in output of 12.7%. These
gains are illustrated in panel two of Figure 7. As with migration costs, we find substantial
heterogeneity. Some origin locations receive wage gains of up to 88%. Again, we explore
what drives this heterogeneity in Section 6.4 below.
As above, we ask how these results are affected by selection. We find, in Column 2 of
Table 5, that, in contrast to migration costs, removing the selection margin has very little
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effect on predicted gains. That is, by ignoring selection, we overestimate the gains from
agglomeration.
6.3 Reducing both Migration Costs and Amenities Differentials
Finally, we consider eliminating both barriers – migration costs and compensating differ-
entials – simultaneously. These gains are illustrated in panel three of Figure 7. Doing so
leads to a 21.7% output gain. The effect of reducing both barriers is slightly smaller than
the sum of their independent effects, suggesting the policies are very mild substitutes.
Under the policy of reducing all barriers to mobility, the origin that benefits the most
would face wage increases of 104%. For this combined policy, accounting for selection is
also important. Column 3 in Table 5 shows that, if we do not account for selection, we
understate gains by 40%.
6.4 Understanding Heterogeneity
What explains why some origins gain more than others? The regions that gain the most
will be those locations that have the largest ex ante frictions, that is, the locations that are
isolated due to migration costs or because they have higher amenity or low house prices.
Formally, we can derive an intuitive expression that shows which locations gain the most.
In the absence of any frictions (amenity differentials or movement costs), wages should
be equalized within origin. That is, average wages of people from origin o who live in
destination d, wageod should be the same as the wages of those from origin o who live in
destination d′, wageod′ . Define wageo = ∑d wageod as the observed earnings of all people
from origin o, and define ŵageo = ∑d ŵageod, the counterfactual earnings if all distortions










Lo (∑d πdowagedo) .
In words, the ratio of optimal wages to current wages is higher the greater the “disper-
sion” in averages wages across destinations. As in Hsieh and Klenow (2009), the equation
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makes clear what the appropriate measure of dispersion is: it is the geometric mean of
wage calculated with respect to θ. This gives a simple data-driven measure of the loca-
tions that are likely to gain most.26 We show in Appendix Figure 3 that the average wage
gain at the origin is indeed increasing in this measure of the initial variance of wages at
the origin.
6.5 Robustness
This section discusses four robustness exercises.
6.5.1 Agglomeration, congestion, and substitution parameters
The main results use our baseline parameters for the agglomeration, congestion, and sub-
stitution. We undertake robustness over these parameters. Results are reported in Ap-
pendix Tables 8 through 11. As expected, when agglomeration is high, congestion forces
are low, and the elasticity of substitution is high, the gains to removing barriers to mo-
bility increase. For the experiment of reducing both migration costs and amenities, our
baseline estimate was an increase in output of 21.7%. The range of results in Appendix
Table 11 is from 15.9% to 24.7%.
6.5.2 Self-employment versus wage work
As noted above, a limitation of the SUSENAS and SUPAS data is that it does not record
earnings for the self-employed. This may be a source of bias in our estimates. For ex-
ample, if migrants are more likely to engage in wage work, our estimates of the impact
26This measure does not take in to account general equilibrium effects through changes in pd. If we wish
















where pd is the distorted set of prices across destinations, and p̂d is the undistorted set of prices. Consider
an origin location that has equal wages everywhere, except one location d∗, where wages are very high,
implying large distortions. Removing all distortions, this origin location will send many workers to d∗, but





accounts for this effect.
While it is possible to derive a closed form solution for this number, it does not add clearly to the intuition.
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of migration on average wages will include both a sample selection effect and a causal
effect. This will tend to bias our estimates of the key selection parameterθ. To explore the
importance of this issue, we make use of the IFLS data, which records income for both
wage and self-employed work. We cannot use the IFLS for our main analysis because it
is too small a sample, and we do not expect to get the same estimate of θ using the IFLS,
because it is not representative of Indonesia as a whole. Nevertheless, we can use the
IFLS to understand the likely direction of bias in our estimates.
Appendix Table 5 replicates our motivating facts using the IFLS sample. The top panel
shows results for the sample as a whole, and the bottom panel shows results for wage
workers only. The table shows that the elasticity of average wage to the share migrating
(Column (3)), which is the inverse of the selection parameterθ, is larger for all individuals
than for wage employees only. We learn two things from this exercise: (1) the motivational
facts are qualitatively robust to including self-employed individuals, but (2) the disper-
sion of talent may be smaller for wage employees than self-employed individuals. The
implied θ for all individuals is around half the size as for wage earners alone. If this is
the case, then our exercise is likely a lower bound on the gains from removing migration
barriers in Indonesia as a whole. We show this is indeed the direction of the bias in a
robustness exercise in Appendix Table 12, where we simulate our model assuming that
θ is half the size of the baseline estimate of θ. The smaller θ suggests total gains from
removing migration barriers that are on the order of 23%, rather than the 22% from our
baseline model.
6.5.3 Asymmetric migration costs
As discussed earlier, identification of the model relies on the assumption that movement
costs are symmetric. One may be concerned that this is a strong assumption; for example,
it would be reasonable to have a prior belief that moving from a small country town to
a large metropolis may be a more costly move than the reverse. We are able to introduce
asymmetry to a limited extent by parameterizing a deviation from symmetry. For exam-
ple, we can assume that τdo = κτod whenever d has a higher population than o, and we
can then estimateκ. We show results from such an approach in Appendix Table 13, where
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it appears that this particular parameterization leads to an increase in the aggregate gains
from reducing migration costs. We do not present these larger gains as our main results
and wish to urge caution in interpretation. While this particular parameterization leads
to an increase in predicted gains, there may be alternative parameterizations that could
lead to a decrease in predicted gains. Because we cannot accommodate all possibilities,
we simply note that the size of the gains are subject to uncertainty.
6.5.4 Human capital
As discussed in Appendix B.2, endogenous human capital acquisition is a concern for
our counterfactuals. We show in the appendix that it is possible to incorporate endoge-
nous human capital into the model; doing so transforms the key sorting parameter, θ,
into θ(1− η), where η is the elasticity of human capital with respect to education spend-
ing. We take a pragmatic approach to addressing the concern about whether endogenous
human capital acquisition would change our conclusions by computing a lower bound
estimate. To do this, we calculate counterfactual average wages in each destination re-
moving frictions and setting η = 0. Effectively this removes all existing education and
any optimization response. We find in Appendix Table 14 that the aggregate gains of
removing all frictions fall from 22% to 18% when we restrict eduction acquisition, with
similar percentage drops in gains for the other counterfactual. It is important to note that,
because we preclude young people who have never moved from increasing education in
response to changes in frictions, this is an upper bound on the importance of endogenous
human capital. Overall, the results suggest there are still substantial gains to removing
migration barriers even in the presence of frictions that limit re-optimization of educa-
tion.
7 Conclusion
Large spatial wage gaps and recent experimental evidence suggest there may be impor-
tant productivity gains from encouraging internal migration in developing countries. We
estimate the size of the aggregate gains in Indonesia. Our approach entails using move-
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ment data to identify constraints on migration, then using wage data to consider how re-
moving these constraints would affect locational choices and wages, taking into account
selection and GE effects.
We implement our approach using unique data from Indonesia, which records loca-
tion of birth, current location, and current earnings. Combined with our model, this data
allows for particularly transparent identification of key model parameters. In particular,
we are able to identify the key distributional parameter that determines the importance
of sorting from a simple linear regression of the origin-destination wage on the origin-
destination migration share.
We find aggregate output gains that are small but important, on the order of 20%.
These estimates hide a great deal of heterogeneity, with some more constrained areas see-
ing gains of over 100%. Failure to account for selection would lead to an underestimate of
the gains; accounting for selection both reduces estimated gains to agglomerating work-
ers in one location and allows for larger gains through improved sorting. We find that the
latter effect dominates.
Future research could aim to deepen our understanding of the mechanisms through
which migration affects productivity. Theoretical and macroeconomic research could con-
centrate on the dynamic effects of encouraging migration. Microeconomic experimental
evidence on the extent and nature of selection among internal migrants, as well as the
strength of comparative advantage effects, would also add to our understanding. Exper-
imental research along these lines is currently taking place as part of the broad research
agenda motivated by Bryan et al. (2014) and related work, including this project.
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Log average monthly wage is demeaned of year fixed effects. Unit of observation is the regency.
Regency is defined as either rural or urban to match the national share of rural.
Source: 1995 SUPAS, 2011 SUSENAS; 2012 SUSENAS.
Figure 1: Distribution of wages: regency level
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Beta = −.036; t−stat =  −2.1.
Avg housing costs 
Estimated amenities from 1995, 2011, 2012.
Variable is first principal component of each group of amenities.
Correlates of estimated amenities, Indonesia
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Data is: 1990, 2010 for the US. 1995, 2011, 2012 for Indonesia.
Figure shows a binned scatterplot. Year effects are removed from both graphs.
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Proportion reduction (κ)
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Data is average across 1995, 2011, 2012 for Indonesia.
The proportion reduction, κ, is defined in the text.
The red dashed line shows the US−level of migration costs.
Output gain from reducing barriers to movement
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Figure shows average wage gain. The unit of observation is an origin−year.
National average (weighted by population) shown in red line.
Shows a reduction of costs of 100%. Data is 1995, 2011, 2012.
Distributional impacts, Indonesia
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Figure 9: Distributional effects of reducing migration costs to US level
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Table 1: Migration rates by origin, Indonesia
Rural Urban All
1995
Migration rate 32.3 35.8 33.7
Moves within category 31.1 74.6 49.4
2011
Migration rate 38.7 33.7 35.7
Moves within category 24.4 84.2 58.7
2012
Migration rate 38.9 34.1 35.8
Moves within category 25.4 83.8 60.7
Notes: Data source: 1995 Supas; 2011 Susenas;
2012 Susenas. Migration is measured as living in
a regency other than the birth regency. Regen-
cies are classified as rural or urban based on the
share of their population that report being rural;
we choose the cutoff to classify the regency as ru-
ral to match the national urbanization rate for each
year.
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Table 2: Five facts about migration in Indonesia
Movement costs Selection Compensating Diff.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. variable log πodt log wodt log wodt log wodt log wodt
Log distance -0.717 0.029 0.007
(0.009)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)***




Destination x Year FE yes yes yes yes no
Origin x Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Destination FE yes
No. of individuals 187065 186763 186763 186763 185357
No. of region pairs 25540 25244 25244 25244 25050
Notes: log πodt is the log of the share of population migrating from o to d in year t. log wodt is the log
of the average wage of migrants from origin o in destination d in time t. An observation is an origin-
destination regency pair. Datasource: 1995 SUSENAS, 2011 SUSENAS, 2012 SUSENAS. Amenity measure
is the standardized value of the first principal component. Two-way clustering of standard errors at the
origin-year and destination-year reported in Columns (1)-(4). Clustered standard errors, at the level of the
origin-year, reported in Column (5). Number of observations changes between columns because not all
pairs with positive migration flows have observed wages.
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Table 3: Four facts about migration in the U.S.
Movement costs Selection
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. variable log πodt log wodt log wodt log wodt
Log distance -0.553 0.023 -0.004
(0.018)*** (0.002)*** (0.004)
Log share migrating -0.043 -0.050
(0.003)*** (0.006)***
Destination x Year FE yes yes yes yes
Origin x Year FE yes yes yes yes
Destination FE
No. of individuals 2294054 2294046 2294046 2294046
No. of region pairs 5084 5076 5076 5076
Notes: log πodt is the log of the share of population migrating from o to d in year
t. log wodt is the log of the average wage of migrants from origin o in destination
d in time t. An observation is an origin-destination state pair. Datasource: 1990
Census, 2010 ACS. Two-way clustering of standard errors at the origin-year and
destination-year reported in Columns (1)-(4). Number of observations changes
between columns because not all pairs with positive migration flows have ob-
served wages.
Table 4: Estimated Frechet parameters
(1) (2)
Indonesia U.S.
ρ (correlation) 0.74*** 0.90***
(0.029) (0.015)
θ (dispersion) 12.5*** 27.6***
(1.36) (3.29)
θ̃ = θ(1− ρ) 3.18 2.69
Mean migration cost (iceberg) 0.39 0.15
Notes: Source: estimates from structural estimation of
model. Transport costs estimated non-parametrically. Boot-
strapped standard errors reported.
51
Table 5: Output gain from reducing migration barriers
(1) (2) (3)
Mig costs Amenities Mig costs, amenities
Baseline 1.075 1.127 1.217
No selection 0.914 1.127 1.133
Notes: Table shows the output gain from removing the barrier com-
pletely. Data is 1995, 2011, 2012 for Indonesia. No selection recalcu-
lates the output gain shutting down the role for comparative advan-
tage.
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Log monthly wage is demeaned of year fixed effects. Unit of observation is the individual.
Source: 1995 SUPAS, 2011 SUSENAS; 2012 SUSENAS.
Appendix Figure 1: Distribution of wages: individual level
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Appendix Figure 3: Variance in origin wages
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Appendix Table 1: Summary statistics for Indonesia and US sample
Indonesia United States
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1995 2011 2012 1990 2010
Demographic
Average age 38.58 39.63 39.86 40.78 44.30
Average age (mig) 38.43 39.31 39.71 41.26 44.95
Years school 8.01 9.85 10.12 13.48 15.24
Years school (mig) 10.17 11.12 11.33 14.03 15.61
High education 0.82 0.92 0.93 0.85 0.93
Financial
Monthly non-zero wage 129.62 188.06 198.72 4424.07 4985.62
Monthly non-zero wage (mig) 174.82 236.25 246.36 4829.80 5667.14
GDP per capita 1328.48 3177.26 3337.69 39982.11 48377.39
Migration
Share migrating 0.34 0.36 0.36 0.40 0.41
Share low educ migrate 0.15 0.19 0.19 0.31 0.30
Share high educ migrate 0.39 0.37 0.37 0.42 0.46
Share migrating (prov) 0.18 0.22 0.23
Number of obs 59,006 68,510 69,330 1,958,123 336,033
Sum of sample weights 13,454,136 17,324,774 17,736,228 39,251,152 32,404,124
Notes: Sample is male head of household, between 15 and 65 years old. Migration defined at the regency
level in Indonesia, and at the state level in the US. Low education is 3 years of schooling or less in Indone-
sia; 12 years or less in the US. Data source: Indonesia: 1995 SUPAS, 2011 SUSENAS, 2012 SUSENAS. US:
1990 ACS and 2010 ACS. GDP data from the World Bank Development Indicators Database. All financial
values reported in 2010 USD.
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Appendix Table 2: Summary statistics for IFLS sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1993 1997 2000 2007
Demographic
Average age 42.27 43.04 42.40 43.41
Average age (mig) 41.98 42.87 42.05 43.40
Years school 5.18 5.83 7.27 7.93
Years school (mig) 6.42 6.92 8.69 8.74
High education 0.73 0.79 0.83 0.87
Financial
Monthly non-zero wage 94.05 111.51 114.82 128.11
Monthly non-zero wage (mig) 125.77 138.41 142.07 155.09
GDP per capita 1181.78 1552.12 1662.29 2276.16
Migration
Share migrating 0.32 0.35 0.39 0.47
Share low educ migrate 0.22 0.23 0.27 0.35
Share high educ migrate 0.36 0.38 0.41 0.49
Share migrating (prov) 0.14 0.16 0.24 0.23
Number of obs 5,496 5,625 7,709 9,976
Sum of sample weights 5,501 5,952 8,430 10,810
Notes: Sample is male head of household, between 15 and 65 years old. Mi-
gration defined at the regency level. Low education is 3 years of schooling
or less in Indonesia. Data source: 1993, 1997, 2000 and 2007 IFLS surveys.
GDP data from the World Bank Development Indicators Database. All fi-
nancial values reported in 2010 USD.
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Appendix Table 3: Migration histories
Entire sample Male HOH
Regency Province Regency Province
mean mean mean mean
Whole sample
Current migrant 0.40 0.14 0.45 0.18
Ever migrated 0.45 0.18 0.48 0.21
People who have migrated at least once
Migrate once 0.55 0.64 0.60 0.69
Migrate twice 0.32 0.30 0.29 0.26
Migrate three times or more 0.12 0.06 0.12 0.05
Number moves 1.61 1.44 1.56 1.38
Migrant who has returned home 0.12 0.19 0.08 0.14
First migration before age 16 0.16 0.17 0.05 0.08
Num. individuals 37612 37612 9425 9425
Notes: Data source: IFLS rounds 1-4. Entire sample is all adults in sample who report a
birth location. Male HOH is people who are ever heads of households over the sample.
Migration history collected for all moves after age 12.
59
Appendix Table 4: Five facts about migration in Indonesia, province-level
Movement costs Selection Compensating Diff.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. variable log πodt log wodt log wodt log wodt log wodt
Log distance -0.606 0.041 0.019
(0.013)*** (0.003)*** (0.009)**




Destination x Year FE yes yes yes yes no
Origin x Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Destination FE yes
No. of individuals 196846 196838 196838 196838 196838
No. of region pairs 1452 1444 1444 1444 1444
Notes: log πodt is the log of the share of population migrating from o to d in year t. log wodt is the log
of the average wage of migrants from origin o in destination d in time t. An observation is an origin-
destination province pair. Datasource: 1995 SUSENAS, 2011 SUSENAS, 2012 SUSENAS. Amenity measure
is the standardized value of the first principal component. Two-way clustering of standard errors at the
origin-year and destination-year reported in Columns (1)-(4). Clustered standard errors, at the level of the
origin-year, reported in Column (5). Number of observations changes between columns because not all
pairs with positive migration flows have observed wages.
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Appendix Table 5: Four facts about migration in Indonesia, IFLS
data
Movement costs Selection
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. variable log πodt log wodt log wodt log wodt
All individuals
Log distance -0.571 0.041 -0.044
(0.018)*** (0.006)*** (0.017)*
Log share migrating -0.079 -0.150
(0.010)*** (0.028)***
Destination x Year FE yes yes yes yes
Origin x Year FE yes yes yes yes
No. of individuals 26820 26732 26732 26732
No. of region pairs 613 546 546 546
Wage employees only
Log distance -0.527 0.026 0.000
(0.015)*** (0.004)*** (0.013)
Log share migrating -0.049 -0.049
(0.008)*** (0.024)
Destination x Year FE yes yes yes yes
Origin x Year FE yes yes yes yes
No. of individuals 12241 12223 12223 12223
No. of region pairs 497 479 479 479
Notes: log πodt is the log of the share of population migrating from o to d
in year t. log wodt is the log of the average wage of migrants from origin o
in destination d in time t. An observation is an origin-destination province
pair. Datasource: 1993, 1997, 2000, 2007 IFLS. Two-way clustering of stan-
dard errors at the origin-year and destination-year reported in Columns
(1)-(4). Number of observations changes between columns because not all
pairs with positive migration flows have observed wages.
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Water pollution (past year) -2.23*** -0.96** -0.91**
(0.86) (0.42) (0.38)
Land pollution (past year) 1.57 -5.15*** -4.91***
(2.73) (1.71) (1.52)
Air pollution (past year) -0.77*** 0.16 -0.24
(0.28) (0.55) (0.50)
Noise pollution (past year) -2.46
(1.98)
Main road village lighting 0.39 0.68* 0.68**
(0.71) (0.38) (0.34)
Has movie theater -10.6 -33.9 -77.1**
(7.35) (41.0) (34.1)
Ease of reaching hospital 0.31** 0.10 0.27***
(0.13) (0.13) (0.10)
Ease of reaching puskesmas/other health facility 0.44* 0.057 0.34**
(0.26) (0.20) (0.17)
Ease of reaching market with permanent building 0.31**
(0.15)










Outbreak (last year): Vomiting/diarrhea -0.85 -0.81
(0.72) (0.65)
Outbreak (last year): Malaria 0.48 0.74**
(0.42) (0.36)
Outbreak (last year): Bird flu (1 case is considered an outbreak) -10.2 -10.6
(8.64) (7.76)
Outbreak (last year): Tuberculosis -0.59 -1.72*
(1.13) (0.97)
Notes: Data source: 1996 and 2011 PODES data and estimates from model. Table shows the regression
coefficient between the estimated amenity value and the amenity measure given in each row. 1996
PODES data are correlated with the model estimates for 1995; 2011 PODES data are correlated with
model estimates for 2011 and 2012.
62
Appendix Table 7: Estimating spillover parameters
Log wage Log amenity Log rents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Log population 0.028 0.012 0.004 0.042 0.228 0.252
(0.083) (0.210) (0.085) (0.215) (0.098)** (0.247)
N 75 75 75 75 75 75
r2 0.89 0.89 0.76 0.76 0.99 0.99
F 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.04 5.38 1.04
Notes: Table shows OLS and 2SLS estimates using the model-based instru-
ment for labor to estimate the strength of the agglomeration and congestion
parameters. Province and year FE included in all specifications.
Appendix Table 8: Robustness: effect of migration cost on growth, In-
donesia
(1) (2) (3)
Sub. elasticity = 4 Sub. elasticity= 6 Sub. elasticity = 8
Productivity spillover = 0
λ = 0 1.113 1.107 1.098
λ = .02 1.112 1.102 1.086
λ = −.02 1.114 1.110 1.104
Productivity spillover = 0.05
λ = 0 1.117 1.103 1.075
λ = .02 1.115 1.090 1.032
λ = −.02 1.118 1.110 1.096
Productivity spillover = 0.08
λ = 0 1.119 1.094 1.033
λ = .02 1.115 1.069 0.929
λ = −.02 1.121 1.107 1.078
Notes: Table shows the effect of reducing migration cost to zero on labor output.
Table shows different combinations of amenity (λ) and productivity spillovers, for
different values of substitution parameter. Calculated for model with selection.
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Appendix Table 9: Robustness: effect of migration cost and housing on
growth, Indonesia
(1) (2) (3)
Sub. elasticity = 4 Sub. elasticity= 6 Sub. elasticity = 8
Productivity spillover = 0
λ = 0 1.115 1.114 1.112
λ = .02 1.115 1.113 1.111
λ = −.02 1.115 1.114 1.113
Productivity spillover = 0.05
λ = 0 1.121 1.118 1.116
λ = .02 1.120 1.117 1.112
λ = −.02 1.121 1.119 1.118
Productivity spillover = 0.08
λ = 0 1.124 1.121 1.117
λ = .02 1.123 1.118 1.111
λ = −.02 1.124 1.122 1.120
Notes: Table shows the effect of reducing migration cost and housing to zero on
labor output. Table shows different combinations of amenity (λ) and productivity
spillovers, for different values of substitution parameter. Calculated for model
with selection.
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Appendix Table 10: Robustness: effect of amenities on growth, Indone-
sia
(1) (2) (3)
Sub. elasticity = 4 Sub. elasticity= 6 Sub. elasticity = 8
Productivity spillover = 0
λ = 0 1.063 1.083 1.098
λ = .02 1.066 1.087 1.103
λ = −.02 1.059 1.079 1.093
Productivity spillover = 0.05
λ = 0 1.074 1.103 1.127
λ = .02 1.078 1.108 1.133
λ = −.02 1.070 1.098 1.121
Productivity spillover = 0.08
λ = 0 1.082 1.119 1.152
λ = .02 1.086 1.125 1.158
λ = −.02 1.078 1.114 1.145
Notes: Table shows the effect of reducing amenities to zero on labor output.
Table shows different combinations of amenity (λ) and productivity spillovers, for
different values of substitution parameter. Calculated for model with selection.
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Appendix Table 11: Robustness: effect of migration cost and amenities
on growth, Indonesia
(1) (2) (3)
Sub. elasticity = 4 Sub. elasticity= 6 Sub. elasticity = 8
Productivity spillover = 0
λ = 0 1.163 1.177 1.189
λ = .02 1.166 1.182 1.193
λ = −.02 1.159 1.173 1.184
Productivity spillover = 0.05
λ = 0 1.177 1.199 1.217
λ = .02 1.182 1.204 1.223
λ = −.02 1.173 1.194 1.211
Productivity spillover = 0.08
λ = 0 1.187 1.215 1.240
λ = .02 1.192 1.221 1.247
λ = −.02 1.183 1.209 1.233
Notes: Table shows the effect of reducing migration cost and amenities to zero on
labor output. Table shows different combinations of amenity (λ) and productivity
spillovers, for different values of substitution parameter. Calculated for model
with selection.
Appendix Table 12: Output gain from reducing migration
barriers: robustness over theta
(1) (2) (3)
Mig costs Amenities Mig costs, amenities
Estimated θ
Baseline 1.075 1.127 1.217
No selection 0.914 1.127 1.133
Set θ̂ = 0.5θ
Baseline 1.115 1.120 1.231
No selection 0.923 1.120 1.127
Notes: Table shows the output gain from removing the barrier
completely. Data is 1995, 2011, 2012 for Indonesia. No selection
recalculates the output gain shutting down the role for compara-
tive advantage.
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Appendix Table 13: Output gain from reducing migration
barriers: robustness
(1) (2) (3)
Mig costs Amenities Mig costs, amenities
Baseline
Baseline 1.075 1.127 1.217
No selection 0.914 1.127 1.133
Migration costs parameteric fn. of distance
Baseline 1.094 1.122 1.219
No selection 0.935 1.112 1.131
Migration costs parameteric fn. of distance, lg pop interaction
Baseline 1.170 1.146 1.303
No selection 0.949 1.108 1.156
Notes: Table shows the output gain from removing the barrier
completely. Data is 1995, 2011, 2012 for Indonesia. No selection
recalculates the output gain shutting down the role for compara-
tive advantage.
Appendix Table 14: Output gain from reducing migration
barriers: robustness over education
(1) (2) (3)
Mig costs Amenities Mig costs, amenities
Baseline (education fully adjusts)
Baseline 1.075 1.127 1.217
No selection 0.914 1.127 1.133
Not allowing education to adjust
Baseline 1.045 1.095 1.183
No selection 0.919 1.128 1.137
Notes: Table shows the output gain from removing the barrier
completely. Data is 1995, 2011, 2012 for Indonesia. No selection
recalculates the output gain shutting down the role for compara-
tive advantage.
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B Model Extensions and Interpretation
This section discusses several extensions to the model: dynamics; endogenous human
capital; non-traded goods; and costly trade.
B.1 Dynamics
We aim to understand whether improving the static allocation of workers would lead
to increased productivity. Consequently, we rule out potential dynamic gains and leave
quantifying these for future work. Some dynamic issues, however, could be a source of
bias in our estimates, and we discuss those in this section.
To understand how to map our model to a dynamic setting, suppose that time is dis-
crete and indexed by t. Our preferred interpretation is as follows. In each period t, every
individual observes current wages, movement costs, and amenities, and decides where
to live for the next period. She moves, and her labor for period t is consumed. The same
process occurs again in period t + 1, and on forever. If the parameters of the model are
fairly stable, most people will move only one time in their working life. This interpre-
tation can be linked to static trade models if one considers the migration decision as the
choice to move to the destination for one period of work.
Given this interpretation, our estimates may be biased if individuals do not maximize
their static amenity-adjusted wages, net of movement costs. One possibility is the chan-
nel emphasized in Caliendo et al. (2017). They model workers who face a cost of moving
away from their current location and therefore chose the destination to maximize a com-
bination of static values and the option value of future moves. Dynamic investment in
human capital raises a separate but similar concern. People may migrate to a specific lo-
cation to invest in human capital and be paid temporarily below their market wage (e.g.,
going to grad school). Alternatively, some dynamic choices may lead to temporary mi-
gration for high short-term wages (e.g., an unpleasant seasonal fishing job in Alaska to
raise money for grad school). If choices of these types are prevalent, we will record the
incorrect wages for these individuals, potentially biasing our estimates.
Based on the IFLS migration histories, discussed in Section 2.1 and Appendix Table 3
we concluded that migration in Indonesia is best characterized by one migration event,
made in adulthood, and hence that these dynamic concerns are unlikely to be a substan-
tial source of bias.
B.2 Endogenous Human Capital
Our base model treats education in a particularly simple way. All people from a particular
origin receive the same education qo, this level of education is exogenous and indepen-
dent of movement frictions, and education is equally valuable in all destinations. This
set of assumptions may bias our estimates of important parameters (for example, θ the
selection parameter) and/or affect our counterfactuals. We discuss each possibility in
turn.
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One way to understand biases is to experiment with different ways of incorporating
education. One approach is to assume that
hid = sidqoeη,
where e is the chosen level of education and η measures the elasticity of human capital
(and hence wage) to a change in education. If we combine this production function with
the strong assumption that workers make their human capital decisions with the aim of




η − ηe) ,













This way of modelling education preserves the key identification requirement (dis-
cussed above) that πdo is sufficient to summarize the impact of amenities and movement
costs on average wages. Hence, identification of the model proceeds as as in the main
text, with slightly different interpretations of the parameters. For example, suppose that
differences in movement costs lead to πdo > πd′o. In the extended model with endoge-
nous human capital, this will lead to wagedo < waged′o for two reasons. First, as in the
baseline model, those that move to d′ are more selected. Second, because those who move
to d′ are more selected, they are also more educated. That is, education creates a comple-
mentarity which increases the impact of selection. Below we concentrate our efforts on
estimating the elasticity of average wage to πdo, if education is not endogenous (as in the
base model) this elasticity captures only the selection effect, if education is endogenous
it captures a composite effect. That is, endogenous human capital modeled in this way
does not create bias, but does change interpretation.
If we relax the assumption that education is chosen to maximize wage, assuming in-
stead that workers try to maximize utility, we no longer maintain the structure that τdo
and αd enter the wage equation only through πdo. This would mean that our method of
identification is no longer valid. Fortunately, we have already presented some evidence
that πdo is sufficient. Fact 4 above shows that, after controlling for πdo, distance (our proxy
for movement costs) no longer correlates with wagedo. Given this evidence, we conclude
that endogenous education is unlikely to be a major source of bias in our estimates, noting
only that the interpretation of the estimated θ is different if education choice is added to
the model.
The model incorporating endogenous education also highlights a concern for our
counterfactuals. If dynamics are thought of as discussed in Section B.1, then it becomes
clear that we are assuming that all individuals, even the elderly, are able to optimize
their human capital choices in response to changes in movement costs. In the model
presented above, human capital investment will increase as movement costs decrease be-
cause workers are better able to match to their comparative advantage and human capital
is complementary to skill. This issue is difficult to deal with while retaining the structure
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of the model. We address this issue quantitatively in a discussion in Section 6.5, using the
model of endogenous human capital presented above. In this section, we set the value of
η to zero and recompute the model. To do this, we need an initial estimate of η. We use
the approach in Hsieh et al. (2018) and calculate this by dividing the share of GDP spent
on education in Indonesia, which is 2.4% (The World Bank, 2014) by the share of labor
income in GDP, 0.45 (Heston et al., 2006). This yields η = 0.05.27
B.3 Non-traded Goods
Prices of nontradeables, particularly housing, are likely to be an endogenous function of
population. In our baseline model, nontradeable prices will be captured in the amenity
term, αd, and λ, which measures the extent to which amenities change with population.
When we discuss calibration of λ below, we will be particularly concerned about endoge-
nous house prices, so we briefly outline here how αd can be decomposed into rents and
other amenities.
Following Monte et al. (2018), let utility be a Cobb-Douglas function of the consump-
tion aggregate and housing, with βh measuring the share of expenditure on housing. The




εαdo(1− τdo)wdεwdosidqo ≡ w̄dosid
where rd is the price of housing in location d and α̃d is a measure of all other amenities
in that location. When we estimate amenities below, we will recover logαd = log α̃d −
βh log rd. The endogenous effect of population on αd can also be decomposed. If α̃d =
αd L̂
λa
d and rd = L̂
λr
d then αd = αd L̂
λα−βhλr
d . We separately calibrate λα and λr when under-
taking counterfactuals in Section 6.
B.4 Costly Trade
Goods trade within Indonesia is surely costly, and incorporating trade costs could change
our results. The main source of concern is not with estimation – differences in consumer
goods prices caused by costly trade will be captured in the amenity term – but with coun-
terfactuals, which may change if endogenous changes in the price of traded goods were
accounted for.
There are two main sources of interaction. First, many policies that decrease move-
ment costs would also decrease trade costs. For example, road widening would likely
decrease the cost of moving goods and also decrease the amount of time required to visit
relatives. We specifically do not want to capture this interaction between trade and migra-
tion costs. Our purpose in writing the paper is to understand whether migration frictions
are an independent cause of low productivity.
Second, changes in movement costs will interact with (trade) market access. Burstein
et al. (2017) discusses one example. They show that an industry’s ability to accept new
27Hsieh et al. (2018) find a value of 0.1 for the U.S. This comes from an expenditure share on education of
6.6%, divided by the share of labor income in GDP of 0.64.
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labor without price (or wage) decreases depends on trade costs. Incorporating this chan-
nel would add an additional dimension of heterogeneity across destinations. While we
do not model this channel, σ (the elasticity of substitution) limits the extent to which one
destination can accept migrants, and acts in a similar manner. A second interaction occurs
if reducing migration frictions leads to an increase in productivity of one destination d,
with a knock-on effect in other destinations that have greater access to d, which now pro-
duces lower priced goods. We note that our counterfactuals should be interpreted with
this caveat.
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C IV Approach and Monte Carlo Simulation
This appendix illustrates the IV approach discussed in Section 4. The estimating equation,
equation (7), is:




ln(πdo) + ln(qo)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Origin fixed effect
+ lnεwdo, (10)













There is an endogeneity problem because the shock, εwdo appears in both the migration
rate and the wage. As a result, OLS estimates are biased, with the implication that θ will
be overestimated.
We propose an IV strategy that uses the common utility of the destination, estimated
using shares from all other origins o′, to provide a “pull” factor for the destination. This
approach has links to the IV estimation of demand systems in IO, such as that in Berry
(1994). We do the following three steps:
1. We construct a vector z1od consisting of all the flows and squared flows to a destina-
tion (dropping the dependent variable flows πod): {log π1d, ..., log π jd, log π21d, ..., log π2jd}∀ j 6=o.
We then run a “zero stage” regression and predict the fitted values l̂og πod = β̂z
1
od
from a linear regression.
2. We then run the first stage regression, where we regress log πi j on l̂og πi j and a full
set of origin-year and destination-year fixed effects.
3. We then run the second stage regression, where we regress log wagei j on log πi j,
instrumenting for log πi j with l̂og πi j and a full set of origin-year and destination-
year fixed effects, and then controlling for the full set of origin-year and destination-
year FE.
This approach follows Angrist and Pischke (2009).
Appendix Figure 4 shows the results of a simulation of our model. As predicted, the
OLS estimate ofθ is upward bias. The IV estimator corrects this bias and is not statistically
different than the true value. Appendix Table 16 shows that our IV estimate of θ is robust
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Figure shows the distribution of the estimated parameter under each method.
IV estimate (mean/sd) = 20.3 ( 2.1). OLS estimate (mean/sd) = 26.3 ( 1.7).
Number of iterations = 100.
The red line shows the true value of theta.
Monte Carlo results
Appendix Figure 4: Monte Carlo Simulations
Appendix Table 15: First stage regression for migration flows
(1) (2) (3)
Dep var: Log prob Baseline Drop large Drop close
Predicted log probability 9.151 6.340 7.140
(0.241)*** (0.232)*** (0.244)***
Destination X Year FE yes yes yes
Origin X Year FE yes yes yes
N 1452 1452 1452
r2 0.75 0.66 0.68
F 1446.16 748.63 858.38
Notes: Table shows first-stage regression of migration probability on pre-
dicted probability. The unit of observation is a province-to-province-year
flow. Column (2) drops the largest 5% of flows when constructing the
instrument. Column (3) drops observations within 500 km of a location
when constructing the instrument.
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Appendix Table 16: Robustness: alternative instruments
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline Dropping large regions Dropping close regions
θ (dispersion) 12.2*** 14.1*** 13.5***
(1.26) (2.00) (1.81)
Notes: Table shows the estimate of theta from the baseline IV specification in Colunmn (1).
Column (2) drops the top 5% of observations when constructing the instrument. Column
(3) drops locations closer than 500km when constructing the instrument. Bootstrapped
standard errors reported.
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D Can the Data Reject our Distributional Assumptions?
Our assumption of a multivariate Fréchet (Gumbel copula with Fréchet marginals) has
important advantages. In particular, the distribution is closed under maximization, and
so we get closed form solutions and transparent identification of key parameters. We con-
sider this transparent identification one of the key contributions of the paper. Other cop-
ulas, such as the Frank copula considered by Lagakos and Waugh (2013), are not closed
under maximization and therefore do not lead to closed form solution.
Nevertheless, it is important to explore whether the data supports the strong structure
imposed by our distributional choice. The multivariate Fréchet implies two important as-
sumptions. First, absolute and comparative advantage are aligned.28 This implies that re-
moving barriers to migration will reduce the difference between average wages of people
born in the same origin, and living in different destinations. Second, the Fréchet distribu-
tion, combined with the assumption that the distributional parameterθ does not differ by
origin, implies that average wages are a constant elasticity function of the proportion of
people who migrate. This in turn implies that removing all barriers to migration will lead
to complete convergence of wages within origin, with only the origin fixed effect qo lead-
ing to variation across origins (and will lead to complete convergence in wages per unit
of human capital across origins). Hence, selection alone cannot generate average wage
differences in our model. This is in strong distinction to the model presented in Young
(2013).
We first look for evidence supporting the assumption that comparative and absolute
advantage are aligned. Young (2014) argues that if, on average, the elasticity of the aver-
age wage with respect to the proportion of the population in that sector is negative, then
comparative advantage is on average aligned with absolute advantage. This is shown in
Table 2: the elasticity of average wage to proportion migrating is negative, hence θ (the
negative inverse of the elasticity) is positive. As pointed out by Young (2014), it is prob-
ably inappropriate to disaggregate these measures too much, Nevertheless, we present
results broken down by destination and origin in Appendix Table 17. These results show
that, although the estimates are very noisy, in all but 5 cases in Column (2) (6 cases for
Column (3)), the elasticity is positive. So we feel comfortable concluding that comparative
advantage is aligned with absolute advantage in the data.
The second assumption is that the elasticity of wages to population shares is constant
across all locations. The above exercise implies that we cannot reject that the shape pa-
rameters are the same, although the test has little power. A second implication is that,
in the absence of amenity differences, the wage gap should be equal to zero at when
movement costs are zero. One way to empirically test this is to look at whether wage dif-
ferences drop to zero as distance (a proxy for movement costs) drops to zero. Appendix
Table 18 below shows a regression of the log wage gap on the log distance. (Note that we
do not include amenities here because they will on average cancel out due to symmetry.)
28To see this, note that the average skill, conditional on selecting into location d, is given by
E(εd|choose d) = Γπ
−1
θ
od . The unconditional mean of the Frechet distribution is given by E(εd) = Γ . There-
fore, E(εd |choose d)E(εd) = π
−1
θ
od which is always greater than 1, because θ ≥ 2 in order for the variance of the
Frechet distribution to be defined.
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The intercept is not statistically significant, although imprecisely estimated. That is, we
see no evidence of the presence of a wage gap at a hypothetical zero distance.
Taken together, we do not find any empirical evidence to suggest that our empirical
specification fails to match the data. There is no strong evidence to suggest that the distri-
butional assumption we make would lead to incorrect inference on either the amenities
or movement costs.
76
Appendix Table 17: Robustness: does





θ, region 1 20.8 5.48
(96.8) (141.9)
θ, region 2 17.7 6.11
(71.2) (25.6)
θ, region 3 -103.7 6.23
(981.1) (49.4)
θ, region 4 -5.31 25.8
(83.3) (67.4)
θ, region 5 22.3 11.9
(72.1) (78.8)
θ, region 6 8.18 -7.15
(12.6) (80.2)
θ, region 7 -2.82 4.85
(83.2) (120.2)
θ, region 8 45.6 2.02
(375.8) (18.9)
θ, region 9 16.4 8.90
(107.5) (24.0)
θ, region 10 -21.6 9.41
(134.2) (14.0)
θ, region 11 7.37 46.9
(26.2) (338.2)
θ, region 12 9.62 0.023
(18.5) (65.6)
θ, region 13 17.4 -34537.4
(82.9) (345255.5)
θ, region 14 27.2 -302.4
(267.1) (3053.5)
θ, region 15 8.63* 10.9
(4.43) (98.2)
θ, region 16 10.6 3.46
(61.2) (31.3)
θ, region 17 12.9 678.1
(77.2) (6746.0)
θ, region 18 -2.38 99.2
(57.3) (894.9)
θ, region 19 8.14 26.4
(9.98) (163.7)
θ, region 20 4.79 -24.5
(4.09) (122.4)
θ, region 21 15.4 15.0
(42.1) (183.8)
θ, region 22 5.01 -13.8
(92.5) (77.2)
θ, region 23 8.79 3.23
(22.1) (19.9)
θ, region 24 80.9 -6.93
(740.0) (15.5)
θ, region 25 12.6 2.95
(40.7) (47.2)
P value from F-test 1.00 1.00
Notes: Table shows the estimate of theta from
the pooled data, and then the specification
where this it is estimated region-by-region.
The p value is the p value from the F test that
all coefficients are equal. IV estimates.
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Appendix Table 18: Wage ratio and distance
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: log wage dowage oo b/se b/se




Year FE No Yes
Notes: Table testing hypothesis that the wage gap is zero
when transport costs are zero.
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